Abstract When comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, it has tended to be solely vis-a-vis the "development state" East Asian experience. This paper broadens the analysis and considers lessons which African countries can learn from other so-called "tiger" economies including Ireland and the East and South Asian countries. We recognise that the latter are indeed clearly significant as many African countries at the time of independence had economic structures and levels of income quite similar to East Asian countries, yet have grown at vastly different rates since then. Exploring why this has been the case can thus offer important insights into possibilities for industrial policy. Yet this comes with some health warnings over East Asian experience. We suggest that another important contribution can come by looking at the Irish example, given its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state direction in the operation of industrial policy. The Irish model is also more democratic in some senses and has protected workers" rights during the development process in contrast to the often highly dirigisite East Asian model. Overall we suggest that some immediate actions are needed, notably with regard to the financial system in small African economies. Without such changes, a poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low levels. In relation to the small size of the African economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient overseas development assistance (ODA) for infrastructural development. It is also critical to note that the various small African economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, and that a "one size fits all" approach is not appropriate; rather the key is to tailor policies and systems to the unique opportunities and development challenges in each African country.
Introduction
African economies, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) stand at an important juncture. During the 1980s, for the average African country, GDP per capita actually fell at a rate of 0.5 percent per annum; in the 1990s it rose slightly at a rate of 0.3 percent per annum (see Table 1 below). However, in the last four years, the average growth rate has been a respectable 3 percent per annum. In 2007, GDP growth rate in Africa was estimated to be 6 percent per annum, one of the highest rates recorded during any year over the last quarter century. Apart from indicating the recent recovery in African economic growth, the table also highlights the poor long term performance of the African economies relative to other developing countries. Over the entire 26 year period, 1981-2007 , as seen in Table 1 , per capita GDP in African countries rose only by 16 percent compared with more than a 100 percent rise for all developing countries. In contrast, for the East and South Asian economies, the growth in GDP per capita has been spectacular, a rise of well over 300 percent. It is a moot point whether this recent reversal of fortunes for the African countries has been due to the late success of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) of the World Bank and the IMF, as is claimed by the two Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank, 2007; IMF, 2008) . These programmes, which have been the dominant influences on Sub Saharan African economies during much of 1980s
and all of 1990s have embodied the Washington Consensus and its aftermath.
According to independent economists [UNCTAD (2005) , and (2007A), ILO (2007) , Mickenley (2005) , and Lall (2005) ], although many countries implemented these programmes, there has not actually been much success in enhancing their economic growth on a sustained basis. Indeed Mkandawire (2005) , a leading scholar of African economies, argues that the SAPs were essentially counterproductive and in fact often led to the wrong kind of structural change which hindered rather than helped economic development.
Rather, the most plausible reason for the fast growth of African economies in the last four years would instead appear to be the huge increase in international commodity prices. Information provided by UNCTAD (2007A), as seen in table 2 below, reveals how the prices of various commodities have changed over this period: The increased value of SSA exports as a result of the commodity price rise helped to relax the balance of payments constraint which in turn led to faster growth. Assuming continued favourable terms of trade, the central issue is whether or not the African countries can translate this recent improved performance into sustained, fast and long term economic growth. Here, though, the economic history of these countries in the last half century does not provide much ground for optimism. The good record of African economic growth between 1950 and 1973 when these economies expanded at a rate of nearly 5 percent per annum could not subsequently be sustained. Similarly, during the 1990s a number of countries were successively selected as the "African success stories"
by the Bretton Woods institutions, none of which could actually maintain fast growth for more than 2-3 years (Mkwaindaire, 2005) . Such economic history invites scepticism about the ability of African countries to convert their recent favourable changes in the terms of trade into lasting progress. The case of the sceptics is straightforward. Apart from all the other handicaps, the African countries have been further debilitated by two decades of stagnation or worse;
and therefore seem unlikely to achieve fast long term growth.
There are however important counter arguments which are equally an essential part of the story. The African countries are today much better equipped for initiating and sustaining fast growth, with a far greater endowment of human and material resources than they were 25 years ago.
 The educational level of Africa"s citizens is much higher today than it was in the early 1970s. This is particularly notable at the tertiary level. There were for example only 7 university graduates in Tanzania in 1964 at the time of the country"s independence from British colonial rule. Today, after independence there are literally thousands, as a result of the establishment of the University of Dar-e-Salam, a splendid institution of higher education.
 There is a network of science and research institutions, engineering colleges, throughout the continent. A number of business schools have also been established and there is now close collaboration between the African and the best business schools in the US and the UK (Pfeffermann, 2008) .
 There are signs of an emerging middle class in African countries. There is evidence also of the evolution of entrepreneurship in these countries (ibid.).
 Moreover, as The Economist (2008) indicates that whereas industrial policy has been highly successful in some countries, it has been equally unsuccessful in others. The African countries would wish to draw appropriate lessons from both sets of countries. There is, however, a prior question which they obviously need to consider. intentions and outcomes often differ" (p. 143).
Why is Ireland an Interesting Comparison for Africa?
When Ireland joined the "Common Market" in 1973, the economy was in many senses a small, poor, peripheral and agriculturally dominated economy with an overdependence on links to its former colonial master, the UK. Trade was limited given ongoing protectionism (it is worth noting that the European Union (EU) in particular had yet to fully open up). Within three decades, however, the Irish economy has transformed itself from being one of the four cohesion countries of the EU to being considered an advanced high-tech enclave of the EU.
There are also other reasons for using the Irish example:
 Ireland, like most African countries is a small economy. It has the geographical size of Sierra Leone as well as a similar population. Given its small size, membership of the EU has played a major role in the evolution of the Irish success story. As well as providing a far larger market for Irish products so as to be able to reap the economies of scale, the EU has also provided Ireland with very large direct assistance for the development of its infrastructure. What could take the place of EU even in a limited sense in the present context of small African countries? This issue will be taken up below.
 Although Ireland is far from being a laissez-faire economy it is by no means as "dirigiste" as the East and the South Asian countries. In particular, it has been more corporatist than the East Asian countries.
The unions have played a major role in the determination of wages and prices. Compared with the East Asian model it is therefore more likely to be directly relevant to the African countries. The East and South Asian pattern of development is heavily dependant on the outstanding qualities of the civil service. These are not simply inherited or endowed but rather are developed alongside the expansion of the economy (see Chang, 2006 . It is worth recalling that during this period the Japanese government used the allocation of foreign exchange in coercive ways as a key weapon to meet government"s targets for specific firms and industries (Brown, 1980) . Similarly during Korea"s main industrial policy period, there is evidence of coercion in the expansion and upgrading of country"s exports by the Chaebol, the large conglomerates which the government itself had created (see Amsden (1989 Amsden ( ,1994 , Amsden and Singh (1994) , Singh (1995 ), Chang (2006 ).
 It should not be forgotten that during the operation of industrial policy in a number of East Asian countries, industrial "peace" was ensured (or enforced) through the suppression of trade union rights. Some would argue that this alone makes the Irish example more suitable as a role model for African countries.
The following sections examine in more detail the operation of industrial and developmental policies in Ireland and their relevance for African countries, before returning to some more positive "lessons" from East Asia.
SMEs in Ireland and in African Countries
The similarities in economic experiences between the Irish case in the (not too distant) past and that of many small African states today warrants research to provide insights as to whether Ireland can regarded as a useful case study, especially around the development of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), especially given their importance in both Ireland and small African states. Of relevance here, some characteristics of Irish SMEs can be noted:
(1) Irish SMEs were focussed primarily upon the home market. Indeed, export oriented SMEs were an uncommon occurrence in the Ireland of the 1970s.
(2) Ireland"s small manufacturing firms in the past were mostly found in "traditional" industries (such as food, beverages and tobacco, textiles and wood products). These industries were characterised by low productivity, skills and research and development (R&D). Until recently, there has also been no well-defined, structured or focussed policy for support of SMEs in Ireland. As we shall see below, industrial policy in Ireland has mostly been geared towards FDI and it could reasonably be argued that this has been at the expense of indigenous companies. This has some similarities to Africa, where an adverse business environment (with little support from government agencies, the regulatory offices and the managers of state enterprises) is an additional impediment for small firms.
5 On the latter point, numerous studies on the barriers encountered by small firms in Ireland have pointed to access to finance as being the single most critical issue (Forfás 1994; Goodbody Economic Consultants 2002; Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2001) . Very recent work on the Irish case shows that small businesses continue to experience difficulties in obtaining appropriate levels of finance for start-up and growth (Small Business Forum, 2006) . This finding has been reiterated in recent work with regard to small firms in Africa.
Despite these apparent similarities, one key aspect missing in the African case is the benefit of European integration in the form of the single market. When Ireland joined the then "Common Market", there was a lack of developed common policies outside of the already well-developed the Common Agricultural Policy (which at the time absorbed three quarters of the EC budget). Over time, though, there have been two ways in which EU economic integration has brought substantial opportunities for small firms: (i) through reciprocal recognition of standards in the Single Market through the Acquis Communautaire and (ii) through the benefits emanating from structural funding, particularly in the sphere of infrastructural development. The latter has brought significant benefits to
Ireland. Beyond the costs associated with the Acquis, it can generate many advantages to small firms in the medium to long run, as they will be able to benefit from the Single Market. This, combined with deregulation in the EU also assists cross border trade by small firms engaging in flexible specialisation.
Finally, the Single Market is also helpful in attracting market-seeking FDI, an element which is very much missing from the African case. In general terms throughout Europe there has been a swing from "capacity" building, with a focus on subsidies for capital and employment towards "capability" building, with a focus on R&D and training interventions by policymakers . We argue that good practice industrial policy is in fact much more "holistic" than the above and focuses simultaneously on both demand and supply side factors of industrial development; on micro economics, meso economics and macro economics. Such an approach is broadly in line with that suggested by 6 Singh (1995) comments on the inter-relationship between industrial policy and macro economic stability with particular reference to the experience of East Asian countries. To the extent that industrial policy was effective in Japan or the Republic of Korea in relieving the balance-ofpayments constraint, it will also have aided macroeconomic stability. A current account balance at the desired growth rate can help to avoid the stop-go cycles which many economies experience. This, in turn, will lower the cost of capital since for a given savings rate in the economy, other things being equal, the more variable and unstable the economic performance, the higher the interest rate. Similarly, faster economic growth also leads to faster growth of real wages, and hence enhances social stability and the political legitimacy of the socio-economic the "Culliton Report" (1992) in the context of Irish industrial policy. Culliton (1992) emphasised provision of infrastructural needs; reform of the tax system; a refocusing of the education and training system; increased funding for science and technology (coupled with greater involvement by industry in steering the use of these funds); and a greater emphasis on technology acquisition. In so doing, the report stressed keeping the role of the industrial promotion agencies under review, as well as the desirability of fostering clusters of related industries building on "leverage points" of national advantage was also highlighted.
As for indigenous industry, Culliton saw the widespread existence of grants as being often counterproductive (the argument being that it encourages a hand-out mentality). In this vein, more emphasis should be placed on: the increased use of equity finance as opposed to non-repayable cash grants; an emphasis on the need for the expansion of the indigenous sector; a reorganisation of grant awarding agencies into two main agencies, one of which would address the needs of foreign-owned industries, the other the needs of indigenous ones.
Culliton was also at pains to stress that the Irish Department of Industry and
Commerce was overly focused on operational matters and needed to place industrial policy formulation and evaluation at the centre of its activities. We argue that a "good practice" definition of industrial policy includes all of these but also needs to emphasise other factors such as well functioning labour and credit markets, an appropriate macro-environment, and attempts to build consensus over appropriate policy direction.
We broadly agree with Hitchens and Birnie (1992) in their commentary on evaluating the Culliton report that the real challenge is to try to weigh the importance of the above factors with regard to the overall "competitiveness problem" (we would however be more inclined to see this as the industrial or economic development challenge). With reference to improving competitiveness (or in our case industrial or economic development) the authors correctly point order. Thus, macroeconomic stabilization and industrial policy interact with each other in a virtuous circle of cumulative causation.
out that there is little point calling for the need to improve competitiveness "…without any satisfactory definition that can be operationalised" (p. 29). They proceed to argue that "this lack of identification of its causes and hence effective solutions is an impediment to a satisfactory industrial development policy" (ibid).
Therein of course lays the challenge for policymakers regardless of country.
Thinking back to Ireland"s less favourable times, the preface to the Culliton report (1992) opens its narrative with the following comment: "over the past six months we have considered industrial policy bearing in mind the 260,000 people who are unemployed. We have concluded that there are no short term solutions, no quick fixes and no soft options left" (p. 7). In addition, it notes; "Ireland"s economic problems are deep-rooted and persistent. Their resolution will require patience, determination and a fundamental re-appraisal of our strengths and weaknesses" (p. 7).
A more "holistic" view of industrial policy also recognizes that organizations operate within a system whereby many factors and policies from a plethora of other areas impact on the success or otherwise of these organizations. An example of the latter can be seen when we look at the case of innovation policy.
Any analysis by policymakers or researchers needs to take account that organizations are not innovating in isolation but in the context of a system 7 . We would argue that Aiginger (2007) in his special issue on the future of industrial policy follows a similar line to the "holistic" definition of industrial policy put forward in the current paper when he outlines that "The upcoming new approach to industrial policy all hints at a more systemic industrial policy, forward looking and emphasizing the synergies with other policy areas, but also fine-tuning to specific needs, comparative advantages and future technologies" (p. 143).
In line with this broad and holistic view of what industrial policy should encompass, in the Irish case we can identify a range of factors which played a significant part in Ireland"s recent "catch up". These comprise:
( This analysis has implications for the design of industrial and other policies in
other small, open and peripheral economies. We suggest that whilst important lessons may be learned, they may not be those picked up by mainstream commentators such as Sapir et al (2003) . Furthermore, it should be noted that a range of factors came together: some more by luck than by judgement, and that the Irish catch-up should have happened much earlier had it not been for previous policy mistakes, particularly at the macro-level .
Indeed, on the macroeconomic-side, stabilisation was an important part of finally "getting things right" in Ireland. By the mid-1980s, the fiscal deficit in Ireland had grown to over 12% of GDP and the public debt ratio was approaching 120%.
The recognition of the need to address these imbalances led to both the social pacts after 1986 and a process of fiscal consolidation achieved by the government reducing expenditure; over the two year period 1988-1989, the ratio of expenditure to GDP was reduced by 9% (see . The pain of this adjustment was eased both by EU funding and an improved external environment with reduced interest rates and improving demand (Lynch, 2005) .
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Of key relevance, the impact of EU structural funding assistance starting in 1988
should not be underestimated: one study suggests that the cumulative effects of funding may have been to raise the level of GDP by over 4 per cent (Schweiger and Wickham, 2005: 50) . Another suggests at least approximately 0.5 of a percentage point to GNP growth during the 1990s (Barry et al, 2001: 549) . In other words, external funding gave Ireland enough space to stabilise its macro economy and to undertake investment (especially in infrastructure) designed to enhance competitiveness; this may be relevant for African economies in the context of overseas development assistance. Similarly, in the Africa case, UNCTAD (2005; 34) notes that overseas development assistance (ODA) could trigger such a "growth process if it is focused on financing pro-growth public investment such as economic infrastructure".
In addition, in the Irish case, currency depreciations which took place in 1986 and 1993 assisted Irish competitiveness; the latter in particular was a 10% depreciation which was then locked into Euro entry. Whilst there was a revaluation of the Punt before Euro entry in 1998, the depreciation of the Euro after its launch delivered a further 20% boost to Irish competitiveness given its external-orientation in trade towards non-Euro zone economies. That this did not feed through into higher inflation is in part due to a number of corporatist social pacts which built consensus.
Such corporatism has been a long-standing central feature of Irish economic policy, with the establishment of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 1973. As noted, by the early 1980s, Ireland faced a "crisis" as the government had embarked on deficit-financed expenditure programmes after the oil price rise of the early 1980s (and indeed the early 1970s). The existing development strategy based on attracting FDI was also criticised for its failure to support domestic industry (Telesis, 1982; Culliton, 1992) . Trans-nationals responded to the crisis by cutting investment and repatriating profits, contributing to a deficit on the balance of payments amounting to around 10% of GNP.
Meanwhile, unemployment rose to around 20% of the labour force.
At this crisis point, the major political parties recognised that an expansionary fiscal policy was no longer an option for Ireland as a small open economy. A social consensus for change emerged. Key to this was the proposal by the trade unions in 1984 for a coordinated approach involving income policies, or "partnership agreements". Indeed, Kennedy (2001: 135)  Competition policy and deregulation: The introduction of competition policy and deregulation in the early 1990s was important in terms of delivering on cost competitiveness for firms using Ireland as an export platform (see Braunerhjelm et al., 2000) .
 A shift in the type of products being traded internationally: Geographical disadvantage may not count as heavily anymore. As Krugman outlined:
"…changes in both the nature of what nations trade and in how they carry out that trade has shifted the balance of geographical advantage in a way that is favourable to Ireland" (Krugman 1997; 44) .
In referring to this well-rehearsed debate regarding Irish growth, we simply wish to stress that there were many factors which contributed to the success of the Irish economy particularly from the mid 1990s onwards, and the industrial policy approach adopted by the Irish government was only one feature in the myriad of factors which contributed to the Irish success story. Yet we would still suggest (see below) that there may be potential for government intervention in the SME sector in small economies such as those in sub-Saharan Africa to lead to significant improvements in the key growth indicators of these countries.
Using Foreign Direct Investment Intelligently
It is widely recognised that foreign direct investment ( electronics especially targeted. These industries were ideal for peripheral locations in that they were characterised by relatively low transportation costs and high growth rates (Braunerhjelm et al, 2000) . Furthermore, the US was targeted as the most probable market for such projects given the likely benefits that would accrue to US firms using Ireland as an export base within the EU.
The promotion and assistance of particular sectors was well timed. It should be noted that problems and challenges remain and that the picture of FDI-induced "transformation" is challenged by some. A key "lesson", as we shall see below in more detail, would actually be that spillovers from FDI are not generated automatically and that an industrial policy that targets and positions FDI is vital to ensure wider spillovers and to benefit the domestic sector. The case is not anti-FDI per se; rather, we recognise the value of high-quality FDI in assisting economic development. Rather, it needs to be stressed that this should not come at the expense of ignoring domestic firms. In a related vein, argue that the contribution of transnationals to the Irish economy can also be overestimated by failing to take account of the following: the high level of imports (including payments for patents, royalties and other tangible inputs) and repatriated profits. Citing the work of Keating (2000), the authors show that "…sales amounted to €72 billion in 2004. However, when imports of €43 billion and profit repatriation of €19 billion are deducted the direct contribution to GNP is only 10 billion" (Buckley et al 2006: 2) .
Attracting high-quality FDI and positioning it seems crucial. Here, lessons with FDI experiences in peripheral regions of the EU seems highly relevant in taking on board elements of "good practice". This includes targeting strategic sectors and linking FDI to cluster development, building trust with local managers in order to try to upgrade local plants, undertaking sector specific research on the strengths and weaknesses of local industry, providing aftercare support, targeting financial assistance at specific upgrading needs (e.g. investment in R&D rather than general support), and the monitoring of performance (see Amin and Tomaney, 1995; Bailey et al 1999) . The Irish experience of selectively targeting FDI seems very relevant here and raises the issue more generally of using selective as well as horizontal industrial policy.
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The discussion of this section will be seriously incomplete without reference to the fact that in the practice of industrial policy in East Asia, both Japan and South Korea discouraged FDI rather than to seek it. Singh (1995) Republic of Korea were as efficient and flexible in their economic policy as they themselves suggested (to account for their long-term, overall economic success), why did they persist with this apparently wrong-headed approach for so long?
Indeed it was not until the 1990s that Japan really finally opened up for inward FDI (Bailey, 2003) .
Perhaps the approach was not so wrong-headed after all? It was "functional" within the context of the overall industrial policies which the two countries were pursuing. First, it would have been difficult for MITI or the authorities of the Republic of Korea to use "administrative guidance" to the same degree with foreign firms as they were able to do with domestic ones. Secondly, as UN and Germany (also 2.8 per cent in 1987). Thirdly, Freeman (1989) stressed another important advantage of the policy of mainly rejecting foreign investment as a means of technology transfer. This, he argued, automatically placed on the enterprise the full responsibility for assimilating imported technology. This was far more likely to lead to total system improvements and broader spill-overs than the "turn-key plant" mode of import or the foreign subsidiary mode.
It is important to emphasize that Japan and South Korea"s rejection of FDI did not mean that these countries are not interested in importing foreign technology.
Quite the contrary. Japan after all has been attempting to obtain technology from abroad for a hundred years, with an emphasis on licensing, joint ventures and foreign involvement rather than FDI. The reason why it did not favour FDI as a source of technology was that it was inter alia comparatively much more expensive than licensing. The latter was a policy pursued by Japan up to the 1980s, when under pressure from the US it began finally to dismantle such barriers and started to allow in FDI without requiring a Japanese joint venture partner (Bailey and Sugden, 2007) . Such considerations may also be valid for at least some SSA countries who may also prefer to import technology through licensing rather than through the medium of FDI.
Fostering Domestic Enterprise
Authors such as One can convincingly argue that the Irish government to a large degree overlooked the indigenous (largely SME sector) until the mid 1990s. As such, this represents a key policy "failure" and should be avoided by small African states.
Admittedly, in the Irish case there were grants available to indigenous firms to start-up and expand -but the focus on indigenous and SME firms was overshadowed by the prime focus by the Irish government on FDI. This is evident in comments from various reviews of industrial policy over the decades; most notably the "Telesis Group" (1980), which highlighted an over-emphasis on foreign industry. The Culliton report also emphasised the need to expand the indigenous sector. However, it was not until the "Task Force on Small Business
Report" published in 1994 that the focus on the SME sector by Irish policy makers truly began in earnest.
Some of the challenges facing small firms in Ireland are similar, albeit in a much more intense form, in Africa, most notably the issue of access to finance. As UNCTAD (2007) notes, this is especially the case for the small domestic enterprises in the informal sector that represent the vast majority of firms. Indeed, it is thought that firms in sub-Saharan Africa fund between one half and three quarters of their new investments from their own informal savings. In order to address this, microfinance systems have emerged in recent years in order to address some of the shortcomings of the financial system in Africa.
More generally, Acs et al (2007) suggest that entrepreneurs in Ireland are held in high esteem, and that this has been beneficial for the economy. This is questionable, however, and Culliton (1992) highlighted "…the negative attitude towards enterprise that is prevalent in this country" (p. 22), with a "…a deeprooted prejudice against failure in business. The stigma that attached to a failed enterprise very often inhibits the individual from ever trying again" (p. 22).
Perhaps it could be argued that such a negative attitude no longer exists.
However, ten years later from Culliton, Goodbody Economic Consultants (2002), although acknowledging an improvement, still noted that the "non-acceptance of "failure", both on the part of financial institutions and the general public is still perceived to be an issue by Irish entrepreneurs" (p. iv). They do however, admit that "these attitudes are somewhat at variance with recent international studies which indicate that the general public"s attitude towards entrepreneurship in Ireland is now highly favourable" (p. iv).
Embedding Growth through Spillovers, Linkages and Clusters
There was an expectation and hope in Irish industrial policy circles that indigenous SMEs would "… grow from foreign firms through linkages and spillovers" (Andreosso-O"Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006: 280) . This spillover argument is often used by governments to justify subsidies for FDI, but it is well known that such spillovers are not guaranteed. It is to this issue that we now turn, asking how successful (where they existed) were Irish Government policy interventions in achieving successful linkages and spillovers between incoming transnationals and indigenous (largely SME) firms? This is significant as some authors see this link as a key element of the Irish "success story". For example, Pike et al (2006; 233) suggest that:
"the role of industrial policy… seems important, with the Irish state and its governance institutions proving adept at providing the kinds of territorial assets that attract the sorts of TNCs that will contribute to development. Ireland may provide an example of a somewhat "strategic coupling" between domestic and foreign owned firms…".
The FDI literature tells us that, if present, positive spillovers from transnationals can lead to increases in the productivity of domestic firms. This can happen via three main routes: (1) demonstration effects; (2) competition effects, and; (3) labour market effects. As noted, spillovers are not generated automatically but are in essence driven by the characteristics of the host economy, such as its degree of economic development, its ability to assimilate imported technology and more generally its absorptive capacity (see Kokko, 1996 and Blomström et al. 2000) . In this section we briefly highlight the key evidence regarding the prevalence of such linkages and spillovers in Ireland. Most notably, despite the rhetoric of "FDI-led adjustment", there is significant evidence to suggest that the Irish economy operates according to a Lewis-type dualism "…with little relationship / interdependence between MNEs and (local enterprises) and each developing according to its own pattern" (Ugur and Ruane, 2004: 3) . As such, each sector appears to have developed according to its own pattern. Such problems of "dualism" remain a major problem in many developing economies; for example UNCTAD (2007; 6) notes that in Africa, FDI is "…relatively volatile and tends to focus on extractive industries with very few linkages to the domestic economy".
In the Irish case, there is evidence from some sectors at least of improved linkages over time, such as in electronics (see Görg and Ruane, 2000; , even if foreign (particularly large) firms have lower linkages -perhaps due to the necessary scale needed to supply such firms (ibid.). Other authors (e.g., Kearns and Ruane, 2001) suggest that the level of R&D activity in a plant is a key determinant with regards to lengthening the duration over which that plant will stay in Ireland, and also with respect to improving the quality of the employment generated in the plant. For high-technology sectors, the evidence of spillover effects is even more evident (Görg and Strobl, 2002; Barry and Van Egeraat, 2008) . Here, there is evidence to suggest that the presence of transnationals in high-technology sectors has had a "life-enhancing" effect on indigenous plants in Ireland, improved indigenous entry rates, and has improved links between manufacturers and components suppliers in sectors such as IT.
Other contributions (by Heanue and Jacobson, 2003; Forfás 2004; Lenihan and Sugden, 2008) have explored the issue of linkages in Ireland. Lenihan and Sugden (2008) argue that the National Linkages Programme introduced in 1985 was partly in response to criticism of an industrial policy approach by Irish government that relied on transnationals and was subsequently restructured by Enterprise Ireland with a focus surrounding the issue of the globalization of local supply industry. This approach resulted in a move towards the building of supply networks and chains as opposed to actual direct local company linkages. Forfás (2004) in analyzing the impact of the National Linkages Programme argued that it stopped short of reaching its potential, while Heanue and Jacobson (2003) argued that there was some success up to the 1990s but thereafter the impact was insignificant. In terms of more traditional sectors, Culliton (1992: 31) In a similar vein, in the case of the software industry in Ireland, evidence
indicates that the vast majority of indigenous firms were founded by former employees of software and hardware transnationals (Buckley, 2005; . In explaining such "success", argue that a number of factors were likely to have contributed to maximising productivity spillovers to the indigenous software industry in Ireland. These include: (1) the fact that transnationals choosing Ireland could be described as technologically superior (i.e. they employed high end technologies); (2) This review only serves to reiterate our point that a holistic industrial policy needs to account for the limitations and fragilities of FDI-led growth and hence also promote measures to grow domestic capacity, and to deliver a variety of growth "drivers" for the economy. It is fair to say that the limitations of FDI-led growth have been increasingly (if belatedly) recognised, and Ireland is now recognised to be vulnerable due to the downturn in the US economy, given its overwhelming reliance on US-based FDI. As such, at this critical period, Ireland faces increasing competition for FDI from emerging economies, and Ireland is no longer a cheap country in which to do business, due to rises in wages and raw material costs
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. Whilst this has been realised, a more holistic approach to policy development at the outset could have avoided some of the problems we identified above, thereby enhancing economic development, a point which small, peripheral economies elsewhere may wish to note.
The discussion here will be incomplete without reference to the role of large indigenous firms in the development process. In many countries, such firms which are large by developing countries standards but rather "puny" in international terms are the spearheads of spreading technical change and productivity growth. Amsden (1989) is the leading exponent of the critical role of large indigenous firms in late industrialization. What is, therefore, required in industrial policy for developing countries is the right balance between the promotion of large and small firms. To illustrate this point, Indian industrial policy in the period 1950 to 1980 is an example of a policy which encouraged small firms at the expense of large firms in order primarily to safeguard employment.
Despite its good economic rationale, this policy is generally regarded as being a failure as it stopped the growth of large firms and thwarted their role in the development process. A balance or "econo-diversity" is thus required. See further Little (1994), Ahluwalia (1992) and Singh (forthcoming).
13 A related point is made by Gottheil (2003) when he argues that FDI is highly mobile and that in the case of Ireland there is also the additional threat that other countries (e.g. some of the New Member States) may also introduce low corporate taxes. He proceeds to argue that from the perspective of a potential investor that "It's the best corporate tax deal that matters" (p. 734).
Policy Evaluation
In view of the types of market failures that are likely to arise in the SME sector noted above (e.g. the finance gap), one possible route to help improve the efficiency of such markets is through the services provided by industrial development agencies. The extent to which development agencies in Ireland have produced the expected effects is an issue of significant and ongoing debate. One key issue that emerged in discussions (particularly pertaining to the 1990s) is that of agency duplication of services provided. The Industrial
Evaluation Unit (1999) found that around 40% of firms that received support from more than one agency availed of such support within the same time period. The prime lesson to be learned in this regard is that the support environment provided by government to firms needs to be clearly targeted and focused in its delivery. A clear underlying rationale for a specific type of intervention needs to be provided in all cases.
One of the outcomes of EU funding in the case of Ireland is that over time there was increased pressure to engage in an evaluation of industrial policies (primarily to begin with for reasons of accountability). Indeed, guidelines from the European Commission (EC) as a result of Ireland being a Structural Fund beneficiary were definitely a key driving force behind the much greater emphasis placed on evaluation in Irish policy from the early 1990s onwards (see Andreosso O" Callaghan and Lenihan, 2006) . The same issues are also pertinent to small African states. A number of possible strategies can be adopted in the context of industrial policy evaluation (options 1-3 are not mutually exclusive and it needs to be stressed that a mixed approach is both possible and even desirable):
1. Wait until pressure comes from outside to evaluate. In Ireland"s case this was from the EU. In the case of the African economies, the impetus may come from agencies providing ODA. This was the stance largely adopted by Ireland from around 1993 onwards. Boyle (2005) writing in the context of evaluation capacity development in Ireland more generally, argues a similar point when he suggests that from the perspective of developing countries that Ireland provides a key lesson in terms of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). More specifically, he outlines that "strong external pressures linked to the availability of significant resources can be a catalyst in initiating an MNE system" (p. i). He argues that an analogy in the case of poor countries is the requirement to work on "Poverty
Reduction Strategies" with related M&E systems, in the context of debt relief as part of the "Highly indebted Poor Country Initiative".
2. Familiarise themselves with "best practice" or at least "good practice" evaluation frameworks and methodologies adopted internationally (reflecting on the key issues learned) so that they are in a position to know "how" to evaluate when requested to do so by external donors or organisations ;
3. View evaluation as a beneficial tool for learning. This would involve adopting a proactive approach whereby evaluation would take place at the three stages of the industrial policy process: policy formulation (ex-ante evaluation focusing on the market failure argument as a rationale for intervention and fundamental economic principles such as opportunity cost); policy implementation; and policy accountability (ex-post evaluation) (Rist 1995) . Such an approach not recognises evaluation as something necessary given external pressures, but more positively sees evaluation as a worthwhile activity in terms of lessons to be learned that can subsequently be incorporated into future policy interventions. There is no doubt that many would regard evaluation as a "luxury" in African economies where resources are already scarce. We would argue however, that if robust evaluations are carried out (which ask the right questions relating to issues such as deadweight, displacement 14 , multipliers and linkages) this may lead to improved future industrial policy interventions which in the long run could prove to be extremely cost effective and efficient.
We do not claim to hold Ireland up a role model in the context of industrial policy evaluation. Indeed, it hovered around option 1 for most of the 1990s, although of late, it is certainly getting nearer to option 3. This is highlighted by Lenihan et al (2005; 14) , who argue that "the methodological rigor of Irish industrial policy evaluations has been improving in recent years". It was not until some pressure came from the European Commission that Irish policy makers and academics began take industrial policy evaluation seriously. This is somewhat difficult to comprehend given that an interventionist approach to industrial policy has been a no intervention had taken place). In this regard, Storey (2000) argues that a prerequisite to any evaluation is that clear objectives be specified. More precisely, he highlights the "…impossibility of conducting an evaluation in the absence of clearly specified objectives for the policy concerned" (p. 177). This calls for a clearly defined set of policy objectives from the outset, and to allow for "trail and error" as an important part of policy development. As UNCTAD (2007; 87) notes, referring in particular to East Asian experience:
"Indeed, the intrinsic differences among the Asian experiences underscore the importance of "trial and error" as an important ingredient of policy formulation and implementation in developmental States. This process should benefit from constant monitoring and the feeding of the lessons learnt from monitoring into new policies to overcome earlier shortcomings".
An additional challenge (as with all calls for evaluation) is who should actually carry out such evaluations. The follow-on question is who should evaluate the evaluators? Clearly, in the face of the level of corruption and lack of resources to carry out some evaluations in some of the African economies, this issue is particularly pertinent.
Bringing in East Asian Experience
Given some of the failures (as well as successes) of "traditional" Japanese industrial policy (see Bailey and Sugden, 2007) , some may conclude that Katz (1998) is correct in arguing that "development state" policies should be avoided.
However, in a sense economies are always in a state of "development"; for us, the key is to adapt and tailor policies holistically to that stage of development.
However, before considering the relevance of the East Asian developmental
State to African countries, we need to ask: is there actually an East Asian model as such? Mainstream contributions sometimes deny the existence of such a model and argue that even if it existed, it was not very successful. Yet real-world business people have no hesitation in identifying an "Asian way of doing business" (Greenspan, 1998) . In this vein, Singh (1999) suggested that there is actually general agreement on the following characteristics of the East Asian "model":
1. A close relationship between the government and business where the government did not act without consulting business and vice versa.
2. Many interventions were carried out through a system of "administrative guidance" rather than through formal legislation.
3. The relationship between the corporation and the financial system in countries like Japan and Korea was also very different from that of AngloSaxon capitalism. The former countries followed the so-called main bank system which involved long-term relationships between the corporations and the main banks. This enabled Japanese or Korean managers to take a long-term view in their investment decisions. The managers were not constrained by the threat of hostile take-overs on stock markets as in the case in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and takeover attempts were often seen as an unwelcome intrusion on the "family way" of doing things.
4. There were differences in the internal organisation of East Asian corporations compared with those of the US and the UK. The former involved co-operative relationships between management and labour, epitomised by the system of lifetime employment. This implied considerable "imperfections" in the labour market.
5. As for competition in product markets, such competition was not regarded by the East Asian authorities as an unalloyed good. Unlike in countries like the US, economic philosophy in the east Asian countries did not accept the dictum that "the more competition the better". The government in these countries were of the view that, from the perspective of promoting investment and technical change, the optimal degree of competition was not perfect or maximum competition. The governments had therefore purposefully managed and guided competition: it had been encouraged but also restricted in a number of ways.
6. East Asian governments sought not "close" but what might be called "strategic" integration with the world economy, i.e. they integrated up to the point where they felt it was useful for them to do so. Thus during their high-growth development phase, Japan (between 1950 and 1973) and Korea (1970s and 1980s) integrated with the world economy in relation to exports but not imports; with respect to science and technology but not finance and multi-national investment (see Chakravarty and Singh (1988) .
Of course, these points represent a characterisation of the East Asian model as an "ideal" type. Not all countries, or even Japan and Korea, have followed the model exactly at all times in the post-war period. As far as government-business relationships are concerned in reality there has been a continuum with the closest relationship to be found in Korea, and the least close in Thailand.
Malaysia and Indonesia fall in between. Similarly, the main bank system worked differently in Korea compared with Japan. Unlike Japan, where the "main banks"
were by and large private entities, in Korea for much of the period these were directly state-controlled. Only in the recent period have they been privatised.
There were also differences in approaches towards FDI and how this was used for development. Nevertheless, there is considerable truth in the view that the Asian way of doing business and the institutional structures it has generated are rather different from those of countries like the US and the UK (Greenspan, 1998; Summers, 1998 1. Selectivity is important. This selection of target industries need to be realistic and related both to the country"s technological capabilities and world market conditions. The success of East Asian countries "owe a lot to the fact that they did not attempt to make too big a step" (Chang, 2006; 126) . Over time, technological deepening can be directly related to selective interventions (Lall, 2006) .
2. Industrial policy needs to be closely integrated with an export strategy, especially in small economies. In addition, scale economies cannot be achieved without entering the export market early on. This in turn brings us back to the relevance of the Single Market for Ireland in providing a wider market. Lall (2006) argues convincingly that the success of export orientation in East Asia did not lie in "getting prices right" and realising static comparative advantage as in the mainstream story, but rather enabling successful selective intervention to build new forms of dynamic comparative advantage which otherwise would not have happened, or may have taken much longer to emerge.
3. Linked to this, Lall (2006) suggests that export orientation imposed a strict discipline on industry and government in Korea and Taiwan; in Singapore this came through the need to attract, retain and upgrade FDI. More generally, the government needs to find ways to discipline the recipients of the rents it creates through the use of tariffs, subsidies etc, in order to compensate for the loss of market discipline.
4. The implementing bureaucracy needs to be both competent and politically insulated. Chang stresses that East Asian bureaucracies improved through continuous efforts over time, and not because of some unique initial endowment.
5. Close interaction between the government and private sector is necessary without the former becoming hostage to the latter. On this, Chang refers to
Evans" (1995) use of the term "embedded autonomy" to reflect the needs for both roots in society but also its own will and power. In this vein, Bailey and Sugden (2006) suggest that where Japanese industrial policy started to "go wrong" was when it was effectively captured by giant firms for their own benefit. Recognising and avoiding such dangers seems crucial to enable policy to function for a public rather than a private benefit.
6. FDI played different roles in technology development in the East Asian "tigers".
Those countries favouring domestic firms restricted incoming FDI, whereas those which targeted FDI sought to guide it and encourage upgrading over time. On this, Lall (2006) argues that in the longer run the only way to promote successful industrial development is through developing and diversifying local capabilities, and that whilst TNCs can assist in this they will do so only up to the point where it is profitable for them. More broadly, it is up to the government to provide the quasi-public goods needed for domestic capability development, upgrading and collective learning. Selectivity in FDI (as in Ireland) seems critical in making the most of FDI for broader development, both in building local capabilities and in tapping into high-tech value chains (Lall, 2006) .
Conclusions
There are some noteworthy similarities and lessons to be learned (positive and negative) by the smaller African economies from both Irish and East Asian industrial policy experiences. Key amongst these is the concern expressed in this paper that industrial policy should not be seen purely in narrow terms, that is with a sole focus on attracting FDI. We argue here that there is need for a more "holistic" approach to economic development which inter-alia focuses on the development of domestic entrepreneurship and indigenous firm expansion more generally as well as emphasising the importance of other supply side factors (e.g. infrastructure; well functioning labour markets). This more all-encompassing view of industrial policy and economic development may, it could be argued, take a longer time to materialise. This is a difficult position for the African economies to be faced with given the extremely high levels of poverty and deprivation witnessed in many of these small African economies. Such a "holistic" growth trajectory could, however, lead to a more sustainable industrial development path, in contrast to the current situation in Ireland whereby the recent down turn in the US economy has sent shock waves through the Irish economy given its (over)dependence on US firms.
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This paper has provided some novel insights by providing a comparison between Ireland, East Asia and the small African economies. When comparisons in terms of industrial policy lessons to be learned have taken place, it tends to be solely vis-a-vis the East Asian experience (which, as seen above, undoubtedly also provides interesting economic development insights but with certain caveats).
We suggest that another important contribution can come by looking at the Irish example, given its emphasis on corporatism rather than simply relying on state direction in the operation of industrial policy. The Irish model has some benefits in that it can also be seen as more democratic and has protected workers" rights during the development process, in contrast to the dirigisite East Asia model (what Thornton and Thornton, 2008 , refer to as "development without freedom").
In relation to the small size of the African economies, the paper recommends regional integration and sufficient ODA for infrastructural development.
Finally, we stress that some immediate actions are needed, notably with regard to the financial system in the African economies. Without such changes, a poorly functioning financial system will continue to keep investment at low levels. 16 It is also important to bear in mind that the various small African economies each face their own industrial and economic development challenges, and we do not suggest a "one size fits all" approach. As outlined by UNCTAD (2007B), referring to East-Asian experience, the path to sustainable growth and development is derived from "a pragmatic mix of markets and state action, taking into account the country-specific development challenges" (UNCTAD, 2007B; 61). It suggests that the challenge for Africa is not how to copy any model, but how to create "capitalisms" that are adaptable to the unique opportunities and development challenges in each African country (UNCTAD, 2007B) . In this sense, useful lessons from elsewhere can be seen, but wholesale emulation of other models is inappropriate. As Coates (2007; 193) concludes (when referring to Japanese experience):
"What works in one period is unlikely to work in the next; and even when it "works", its distribution of costs and benefits is never socially equal. So when deciding which tiger to ride, it is worth remembering that the choice is only between tigers, and that if a safe ride is what you want, you would do well not to ride tigers at all".
